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I. INTRODUCTION and BACKGROUND
The United States armed forces have relied heavily on the
"force multiplying" effect of technology. The importance of
technology in the conduct of war is demonstrated in the words
of the former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Field Marshal
Nikolai Ogarkov:
[R]apid changes in the development of conventional means
of destruction in the developed countries of
automated,...long range, high-accuracy,...combat
systems,.. .and qualitatively new electronic control
systems makes many types of weapons global and makes it
possible to sharply increase.. .the destructive potential
of conventional weapons, bringing them closer.. .to weapons
of mass destruction in terms of [their] effectiveness.
(Gliksman, 1990, p.38)
Maintaining a lead in this technological development has
been the aim of the United States armed forces for some time,
and at the root of this growing technology lies the
semiconductor. The importance of the electronics and
semiconductor industries to the national defense has been
voiced many times. In the words of Craig Fields, former
director of DARPA, "nothing is more essential for superiority
in almost every type of conventional weapon." (Smith, 1989,
p.254) Voicing similar opinions, Secretary of Defense Richard
Cheney noted that "these technologies form the core of [our]
future capabilities in anti-submarine, electronic and
strategic warfare, low-intensity conflict, special operations
and other military missions." (Struck, 1990, p.10)
During a time when America is reducing her forces,
electronics will play an ever increasing role in the defense
of our country. While reliance on semiconductors continues to
rise, however, there is a growing perception that the United
States is losing the technological edge in semiconductors to
other countries, specifically the Japanese. With DARPA
spending millions of dollars a year to fund research and
support this critical industry, a closer look at the forces
acting on it may help identify what actions will improve our
competitive situation in the future.
A. THE AMERICAN INDUSTRY
America emerged from the second world war as the
preeminent superpower in the world. Its strength lies in the
power of her military and the vitality of the economy. Until
the early 1980s, America's economic position went virtually
unchallenged. Since that time, however, the Japanese and the
Europeans have made strong economic advances, with the
automobile and electronics industries being the most obvious
examples of where the United States has lost market share and
some of its world leading position.
At the heart of the growth in the electronics industry
lies the semiconductor. Americans have invented and
manufactured electronic devices for some time, but the pace
and expansion of the industry really exploded after the
invention of the transistor at Bell Laboratories in 1949. The
transistor, the first semiconductor, allowed the
miniaturization of electronics by replacing the bulkier and
more fragile vacuum tube. The first integrated circuit,
containing multiple transistors on one silicon chip, was
invented by Jack Kilby and Robert Noyce in 1959. These two
major advances accelerated the growth of electronics and
created what we know today as the semiconductor industry.
(SIA, 1989, p.3)
1. The "Food Chain" Analogy
Since that time, the semiconductor industry has grown
to be a multi-billion dollar industry, feeding an even larger
electronics industry. Dr. James Gover, member of the
Semiconductor Products Division of the Sandia National Labs,
uses the "food chain" analogy shown in Figure 1.1 to describe
the interdependence of the industry. Semiconductor materials
and manufacturing equipment producers make up a very small
portion of the industry, feeding the semiconductor
manufacturers. The semiconductor manufacturers, in turn, feed
a much larger electronics industry composed of products from
cameras to computers (Gover, 1990). For example, the American
semiconductor industry had revenues of $13.4 billion in 1988,
making possible the production of $278.9 billion worth of
electronics in the same year (SIA, 1989, p.3). Electronics
play a vital role in our economy. Everything from automobiles
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Figure 1.1 Diagram of the "Food Chain" Concept:
The Multi-Tiered Electronics Industry.
2. Merchant and Captive Producers
American companies manufacturing semiconductors can be
grouped into two broad categories. "Merchant" companies
produce semiconductors for sale to electronics manufacturers.
Examples of merchant producers include Advance Micro Devices,
Intel, Motorola, National Semiconductor, and Texas
Instruments. "Captive" companies manufacture semiconductors
solely for use in their parent company's products. IBM ,
AT&T, and Digital Equipment Corporation are well known
examples of American captive producers (Nordwall, 1987, p.94).
This production focus impacts the performance of the firm
significantly. Merchant producers compete against themselves
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and foreign firms; they are subject to price fluctuations and
the competitive marketplace. Captive producers are not
subject to the fluctuating chip Prices of the market
situation; their revenues are based on the sale of their final
electronic products. (SIA, 1989, p.3)
The category in which the semiconductor manufacturer
falls may also impact on his level of research and
development. American semiconductor manufacturers have
historically spent betwtten 8 and 14 percent of their total
sales on research and development (SIA, 1989, p.4). However,
American spending slipped to between 6 to 7 percent of sales
in the late 1970s and early 1980s (The Economist, 1988, p.65).
Captive manufacturers are often in a better position to invest
i- research and development because their revenues are not
directly tied to the semiconductor market. Japanese
semiconductor makers are good examples of "captive" producers
that also sell in the open marketplace. They are part of
integrated conglomerates that guarantee them an in-house
customer (Nordwall, 1987, p.94). This situation may help
explain why the Japanese have maintained a level of spending
in research and development equal to 12 to 15 percent of sales
over the past decade (The Economist, 1988, p.4).
B. THE JAPANESE INDUSTRY
Recent Japanese culture has evolved around self-
sacrifice and teamwork for the good of the whole. It is not
5
surprising that this current culture has spilled over into
Japanese investment and business practices. American emphasis
and culture revolve around ingenuity and entrepreneurship in
a free and open market. Even American antitrust laws favor
open competition at the expense of cooperation among firms.
This different philosophy on the conduct of business has
proven to be significant in the world semiconductor market.
I. U.S. Perception of the Japanese Focus
In Japan, there is a much greater emphasis on
cooperation between industry and government. In the view of
the American semiconductor industry, the Ministry of Trade and
Industry (MITI) targets specific American industries for
Japanese leadership. The existence of these specific industry
goals and strategies have allowed Japanese corporations to be
extremely effective in the global marketplace. The
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), an American
organization of semiconductor manufacturers, has outlined what
they perceive to be the significant differences between the
Japanese and American approach to the semiconductor
marketplace. (SIA, 1989, pp.6-8)
a. National Industrial and Trade Policy
As already discussed, the SIA feels that MITI
targets specific global markets for Japanese leadership while
protecting its domestic market from severe foreign
competition. Even after trade restrictions were lifted in
6
1975, America's share of the Japanese market has grown little.
While America's share of other global markets ranges from 50
percent to 80 percent, the American share of the Japanese
market averages just 10 percent (SIA, 1989, p.7). One
inference that can be drawn from this unchanging position is
a protected Japanese marketplace. However, many other
factors, including technological change, can explain the lack
of American growth in this area.
b. Company Structure
Japanese semiconductor manufacturers are vertically
integrated divisions of large conglomerates. These divisions
are "captive" producers that also sell chips on the open
market in direct competition with smaller American "merchant"
firms. The SIA feels that American firms may be at a
disadvantage competing with these larger Japanese
corporations. The relative size of Japanese firms as compared
to American firms is demonstrated in the revenues chart shown
in Figure 1.2 on the following page.
c. Capital Availability
Japanese industry is organized into large groups
which are comprised of manufacturers, banks and insurance
companies. American antitrust laws may forbid the
establishment of such close relationships in the United
States. Through these organizations, coupled with the much










producers have access to large investment capital at
reasonable rates. American producers must raise capital in
the traditional way, through sales of stock or increased debt.
d. Management Style
Japanese companies plan in much longer cycles than
their American counterparts. Less emphasis is placed on short
term profitability, and the long term planning goal is
stressed. The Japanese culture of working toward goals that
will improve the good of the whole are evident in their choice
of management style. Japanese corporations also tend to focus
better on their "core competenciss", the strengths that are at
the root of the organization, than their American counterparts
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, p.80). The ability to focus on the
longer term has helped them to compete effectively in the
semiconductor marketplace.
2. Japanese Point of View
While the SIA has used the term "targeting" to
describe the trade policies of MITI, the Electronics Industry
Association of Japan (EIAJ) puts forth a different view of
Japanese actions. EIAJ is quick to point out that MITI has
attempted to improve the environment in the electronics
industry in an effort to create vigorous private sector
activity. MITI has not encouraged or supported the formation
of cartels or other industry restructuring. EIAJ also points
out that there are benefits from joint research activities,
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but those actions do not inhibit free competition. Co-
operative research associations in Japan are limited to
research activities and technical assistance, and research
associations come under the supervision of the Fair Trade
Commission. The EIAJ admits that direct financial assistance
is provided to some companies. However, the assistance
provided is much less of a benefit to Japanese firms than the
United States investment tax credit was to American cL4A nies.
(OECD, 1985, p.70)
C. TECHNOLOGY
Before focusing on the current market conditions in the
semiconductor industry, a brief look at the technology
involved in the manufacture of semiconductors, along with some
of the terminology used to describe the variety of "chips"
produced, will be helpful in our analysis.
1. Manufacturing Technology
The manufacturing of semiconductors is a tedious and
delicate process, involving many steps, in which hundreds of
copies of an integrated circuit are formed on a silicon wafer.
The manufacture consists of four basic steps: wafer
production, wafer fabrication, electrical testing, and
assembly. Wafer fabrication is the most complex and difficult
part of the processes.
Wafer production first takes purified silicon, created
from sand, and heats it until melted. A "seed" of solid
10
silicon is then placed in the liquid and a large crystal is
allowed to form. This crystal "ingot" is then ground and cut
into thin "wafers". These wafers are ground and chemically
polished until smooth. The wafer is the raw material in the
next step, the fabrication process.
The fabrication process takes place in a clean room
where a series of steps are conducted on the wafer to form the
integrated circuit. The oxidation step fucms a uniform
silicon dioxide film on the surface of the wafer. The masking
step, referred to as photolithography, applies a light
sensitive film to the wafer and then "exposes" the film to
intense light. A mask pattern is then left on the surface of
the wafer. The etching step removes the photoresist, much
like film is developed, and the wafer is baked hard to retain
the pattern. Chemical baths then etch away the pattern not
covered by the hardened photoresist. The Doping step implants
electrons, which alter the electrical character of the
silicon, into the pattern that was etched away. These
oxidation, masking, etching, and doping steps are repeated
many times until complex circuits are formed in the wafer.
The dielectric deposition and metallization step connects the
individual devices with metal depositions and patterned
insulators. The passivation step then forms a final
dielectric layer to protect the circuit from contamination.
The manufacture of the semiconductor has two final
processes, an electrical test and assembly. A computer driven
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test system inspects the chips for functionality and marks
chips that have failed with ink. A diamond saw then slices
the processed wafer into single "chips", discarding the failed
ones. The chips are then assembled with contact leads and
wires and sealed in a plastic coating for protection.
2. Semiconductor Product Classifications
Since the invention of the first semiconductor, many
different types of circuits have been formed in silicon (and
other materials) and just as many classifications have been
used to describe them. Semiconductors are often classified by
the technology used in the fabrication process or by their
functional breakdown as electronic components. It is the
latter classification, by function as electrical component,
which will be used in this analysis.
Three major divisions of function are used in the
description of semiconductors: discrete components, integrated
circuits, and special purpose devices. Discrete components
are devices such as transistors, rectifiers and diodes. The
integrated circuit is the fastest growing and major product of
the semiconductor industry. The integrated circuit includes
two major product areas: microprocessors and memories.
Microprocessors can be divided into micro-control units (MCUs)
and micro-processing units (MPUs). Integrated circuit
memories can be further divided into random-access memories
(RAMs) and read-only memories (ROMs). Special purpose devices
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are exactly as they sound, manufactured to meet special needs.
The term, application specific integrated circuit (ASIC),
refers to these special purpose devices. Many of the
semiconductors used by DoD fall into this latter category.
(OECD, 1985; pp.10-11)
The distinction of the different classifications of
semiconductors is tedious, but the functional difference, and
differences in the manufacturing process created by those
functions, play a critical role in understanding the
marketplace. The breakdown of integrated circuits is
especially important. Microprocessors are a logic chip which
incorporate the central processing unit of the computer on a
single chip. The circuits of microprocessors are complex as
compared to memory chips. RAM chips contain the usable memory
of the computer and are a series of identical patterns
throughout the chip. RAMs can be further divided into dynamic
(DRAMs) and static (SRAMs) devices. RAM chips contain memory
that can be written to and read from many times, while ROM
chips are memories that can be read many times but written to
only once . ROM chips can also be categorized into erasable-
programmable (EPROMs) and electrically-erasable (EEPROMs)
memories. The circuits in ROM chips tends to be more complex
than circuits used in RAM devices, depending on the desired
use.
Semiconductors can also be made from materials other
than silicon. The most recent research involves combining
13
elements from part III and part V of the table of elements;
these materials are referred to as III/V compounds. The most
promising of the compounds is Gallium Arsenide (GaAs). Use of
these materials often results in much higher operating speeds
and resistance to radiation. Figure 1.3 breaks down the
different classifications of semiconductors into categories
representative of their phase in the product life cycle
(California Technology Stock Letter, 1990, p.4).
3. Relevance of Technology
Having an understanding of basic semiconductor
manufacturing technology is useful in grasping the nature of
the market. The production of semiconductors is truly "high
-tech". Research and development plays a large part in the
relatively near term success of firms in the industry. When
major discoveries are made, they are often directly translated
into competitive advantages for the firms who have access to
this new technology, and the manufacturing technology is
advancing at a rapid rate. To produce the next generation of
memory chips, sub-micron resolutions will be necessary. Goals
of 0.50 micron circuit widths will be reality in the near
future. For comparison, the width of a human hair equals
approximately 100 microns, and 0.50 microns is equal to the
wavelength of green light. The physics involved at these
small levels changes, and even incremental improvements in
14
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resolution require a great deal of effort. Once this
technology is lost, it is not easily regained. (Brueck, 1990)
D. THE SEMICONDUCTOR MARKETPLACE
Our previous discussion has eluded to the importance of
semiconductors in the worldwide market for electronics, but
what firms make up the manufacturing industry? Table 1.1
lists the world's top 10 semiconductor producers based on
their 1989 revenues (San Francisco Chronicle, 1990, p. c4).
American captive producers are not included in the Table
because the level of their production of semiconductors is
held closely by the corporations.
TABLE 1.1 THE WORLD'S TOP TEN SEMICONDUCTOR MAKERS
1989 8.venues Chanqe
Company Country (i billion) From 1988
NEC Japan $4.96 9%
Toshiba Japan 4.88 11
Hitachi Japan 3.93 12
Motorola United States 3.32 9
Fujitsu Japan 2.94 13
Texas Instruments United States 2.78 2
Mitsubishi Japan 2.62 14
Intel United States 2.44 4
Matsushita Japan 1.87 -1
Philips Netherlands 1.69 -3
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The market for semiconductors continues to grow, and 1990
revenues are estimated at approximately $50 billion.
Integrated circuits make up the majority of that market,
accounting for $41 billion in 1990 sales. Figure 1.4 shows














As noted in the first chapter, semiconductors and their
impact on electronics play an important role in providing the
"force multiplier" effect in today's weapon systems. National
defense can also be framed as economic strength. A strong
defense cannot be maintained without a vibrant economy to
support it. Ian Ross, president of AT&T Bell laboratories and
chairman of the National Advisory Committee on Semiconductors
(NACS), voices the concern of many:
Semiconductors are the heart of sophisticated electronic
guidance systems and other vital elements of modern
weaponry. In order to maintain a strong national defense
we need a domestic semiconductor industry second to none.
(Leopold, 1989, p-11)
In this chapter, the views and opinions presented are
those of the semiconductor manufacturers and other
knowledgeable individuals in this field of study. An analysis
of the validity and strong-points of their viewpoints will be
presented later in the thesis.
A major change has occurred in the perception and outlook
for American semiconductor makers over the past decade. At
the beginning of the decade, semiconductor manufacturers,
along with other high growth electronics industries like
personal computers, were hailed as the great success stories
of the free market system. Now the industry portrays itself
as one under excessive pressure from the fierce competition of
19
foreign firms (The Economist, 1988, p.65). Ironically, it was
competition that was hailed as making semiconductor
manufacturers great just ten years earlier.
This decline in market share comes when the industry
should have been enjoying good times. During the mid 1980s,
the worldwide market was growing at a 30 percent annual rate.
Growth in the market still remains moderately strong today, at
approximately 10 percent (Electronics, 1990, p.82). American
firms' share, however, continues to decline. American
semiconductor manufacturers currently have 35 percent of the
world market for semiconductors, down from 37 percent in 1989.
Japanese firms, in contrast, control 51 percent of the markat
and their share continues to grow. This dramatic change is
shown in Figure 2.1. Contrast this position with America's 58
percent share of the global market in 1980, when Japan
controlled just 28 percent of the market. The erosion of
America's market share to other competitors is demonstrated in
Figure 2.2. This is not the only bad news. Japan has been
able to maintain approximately 90 percent of its domestic
market, while Asian/Pacific manufacturer's global market
share, not including Japan, has grown at a pace four times the
worldwide average over the past few years (Goldman, 1990,
p.8). The market share of the Japanese market is shown in
Figure 2.3. With this trend continuing, it is easy to




























A. KEY EVENTS IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR MARKETPLACE
A look at some key events over the life of the industry
may shed some light on the ongoing competition between
American and Japanese semiconductor producers.
0 1956, Shockley Semiconductor founded and the commercial
semiconductor industries begin in America and Japan.
. 1957, MITI passes Extraordinary Measures Law for the
promotion of the electronics industry.
. 1959, Jack Kilby and Robert Noyce co-invent the integrated
circuit and Japan targets computer industry as a high
priority.
. 1960, Japan restricts sales of IBM computers and forces
IBM to license 15 basic patents to Japanese electronics
companies.
• 1960-1970, Japan limits Texas Instruments to 10 percent
share of the Japanese market while excluding Motorola from
the market entirely.
. 1970, 1K DRAM introduced by Intel
. 1971, Intel invents the microprocessor and EPROM
technology is introduced.
• 1972, Japan agrees to remove formal trade restrictions on
electronics products.
• 1975, Japan removes formal trade restrictions under the
1972 agreement.
. 1977, Programmable logic technology introduced.
. 1978, Japanese 16K DRAMs enter the marketplace.
• 1979, Japanese capture 40 percent of the 16K DRAM market.
• 1980, Toshiba introduces 64K DRAMs six months ahead of
American producers.
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* 1981, Nippon T&T introduce prototype 256K DRAM; American
firms have 57 percent of the global semiconductor market
while Japan holds 33 percent.
* 1983, Japan surpasses the U.S. in total absolute
investment in semiconductor technology while MITI
encourages Japanese companies to purchase more U.S.
manufactured chips.
* 1985, Japanese firms slash DRAM and EPROM prices; 256K
RAMs enter the market and every American company except TI
and Micron abandon the DRAM business.
* 1986, Japan signs semiconductor trade agreement limiting
exports of DRAM chips to the U.S., after allegations that
Japanese firms "dumped" DRAMs into the U.S. market the
previous year.
* 1987, SEMATECH, a semiconductor manufacturing research
consortium is founded in the United States.
* 1987, April, President Reagan levies $300 million in
sanctions against Japanese products for non compliance
with 1986 trade agreement.
* 1987, November, all remaining sanctions against Japanese
producers are lifted.
* 1989, European Community (EC) set specific criteria to
determine if chips are EC made; EC prepares to levy
tariffs against all non-EC chips imported into Europe.
* 1990, American companies share of the global semiconductor
market falls to 35 percent while Japanese firms control 51
percent.
American producer's concern is voiced by venture
capitalist Arthur Rock, known for helping build Silicon
Valley: "my great fear, is that some day we will wake up and
the Japanese companies will say they are sorry and cannot
supply us with the necessary semiconductors to make our
computers because they need them for their own production."
(Clark, 1990, p.cl)
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B. THE IMPACT AND IMPORTANCE OF DRAMs
After what industry officials viewed as "dumping" of DRAMs
by the Japanese in 1985, all but a few American merchant
companies gave up on the production of DRAM chips. However,
captive producers continued to make memory chips for their own
use. According to Dataquest, American withdrawal from the
DRAM market is the key reason for its large loss of market
share in semiconductors (Rice, 1990, p.lf). Asian/Pacific
intrusion into the marketplace can also be attributed to
American companies abandonment of the DRAM market (Goldman,
1990, p.8). Figure 2.4 illustrates this change. Since the
U.S. and Japanese agreement not to sell DRAM chips below cost,
one American firm has reentered the market. Today, three
American firms continue to produce DRAMs in the United States
for sale in the open market: Texas Instruments, Motorola, and
Micron Technology (Rice, 1990, p.8f).
DRAMs constitute the largest single element in the
semiconductor industry. In 1990 they are expected to reach
$8.8 billion in sales, increasing to approximately $14.9
billion by 1993. DRAM production technology tends to be at
the more mature end of the technology spectrum. In contrast,
the production of microprocessors and specialty chips fall
into the more innovative end of the technology spectrum.
Japanese producers dominate this mature production technology
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Figure 2.4 DRAM producers: 1972 -1987
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DRAMs have been referred to as the "technology drivers"
within the industry because producers and designers of DRAMs
can often exert influence over the development of other
electronic systems. DRAMs, and other memory circuits, are
crucial to the testing of manufacturing technology. Even in
GaAs semiconductor production, where memory is not a large
factor, the production of memory circuits is critical in
detecting problems in the manufacturing process. The
production of memory circuits duplicates millions of identical
patterns on the chip material. The production of processors,
and other semiconductors, are complicated patterns where the
causes of problems are more difficult to isolate between
manufacturing and design. (Prabhakar, 1990)
DRAMs are not only a test-bench for future technologies,
they also provide much needed revenue to support on-going
research. Future DRAM growth will be fueled by the ever
increasing demands for memory use by next generation.
applications (SIA DRAM market facts). DoD's appetite for
DRAMs and other memories may also increase as reliance on
processing battlefield information grows in importance.
Improvements in military information technology, and the
increased military capability provided by improved data
collection and management, will have more of an impact in
future military potential than increasing the lethality of
individual weapon systems (Gliksman, 1990, p.39). This
information driven revolution will permit the replacement of
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firepower with brainpower, increasing DoD's reliance on the
semiconductor and electronics industries.
C. AMERICAN STRENGTHS
While America's share of the total marketplace has
declined, American companies still have a firm hold on some
segments of the semiconductor market. Production of
microprocessors and specialty chips are still considered an
American strong-point. According to Andy Grove, chief
executive of Intel Corporation, "the only thing that's
American in those products [notebook and laptop computers] is
software and microprocessors." (Clark, 1990, p. cl) If
American producers are not careful, however, they may discover
the Japanese and other foreign producers also making inroads
into this segment of the marketplace. MITI is supporting a
move by Japanese producers to get out of low added-value
memory devices and into more lucrative advanced
microprocessors. Microprocessors are not only more va]uable,
they require additional proprietary circuits to support them
(The Economist, 1989, p.76).
D. ROOT CAUSES OF THE INDUSTRY DECLINE
What forces have caused American firms' rapid decline in
market share? The decline in America's ability to compete in
the DRAM market may not be the only force at work in this
pattern of trade. For example, much of the reduction in
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markec share can also be attributed to the dollar's fall
against the yen (The Economist, 1988, p.65). The National
Advisory Committee on Semiconductors (NASC) breaks down what
it considers the root causes of America's decline in this
critical market into three broad categories: the business
environment, the market, and the state of technology. (NACS,
1989, pp.17-21)
I. The Business Environment
The NACS emphasizes that the differences in the
business environment between the United States and its major
competitors have worked to the advantage of foreign producers
and to the detriment of the American industry. The major
differences being the availability of low-cost capital,
supportive industry practices of foreign producers, failure of
the U.S. school system to provide trained workers, and
difficulty in enforcing U.S. legal rights abroad.
The most serious disadvantage, as stated by the NACS,
is the lack of low-cost capital for American firms. As
already noted, future competitiveness in semiconductors relies
heavily on research and development. A lower cost of capital
allows foreign competitors a lower risk in investment
decisions, enabling them to take a longer range focus toward
the marketplace. The lower cost of capital also helps
competitors weather downturns in the business cycle.
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It is also felt by the industry that foreign
competitors benefit from favorable industry policies and the
support of their national go',ernments. Policies such as
closing markets to outside competition and coordinating
research and development have given the impression of an
unfair advantage. Compound these market conditions with an
American education system that emphasizes education of
students in theoretical disciplines, but neglects
manufacturing training. This reinforces the impression of the
un-level playing field.
The final cause of decline in the business environment
exists in the lack of enforcement of U.S. copyrights and
patents overseas. Japan required the licensing of key
semiconductor technologies in the 1960s and 1970s in order to
allow TI and IBM access to their domestic market (SIA, 1989,
p.9). This biased legal situation is compounded by strict
U.S. antitrust legislation regulating cooperation among
American firms and limiting the formation of large
semiconductor conglomerates in the name of free trade.
2. The Market
The NACS notes that the fundamental problem in market
conditions facing American producers is the transfer of the
electronics customer base to the far east. It has already
been emphasized that semiconductors are an integral part of
the "food chain" of modern electronic technology. Just as the
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production of memory chips has migrated to Japan, so has most
of the world's electronics industries. The shift in the
production of consumer electronics is probably the most
striking example. With a large portion of the potential
customers for American semiconductors being overseas, the
problem of American firms recapturing market share is
compounded. If the design of electronic systems is done in
Japan, it should not be surprising that they call for Japanese
components in the assembly of the final product.
3. The Technology
Semiconductors are high technology products and
require a substantial amount of research and development to
produce. A large investment in people, technology and
facilities is required to maintain a competitive posture.
Japanese producers have been able to out-invest their American
counterparts. In 1983, they surpassed the United States in
total investment in semiconductor technology (SIA, 1989, p.4).
This is not the only area where Japan has outperformeu
American firms; American firms have not supported joint
research in the early stages of process and material
development. Today, the majority of semiconductor
manufacturing equipment is owned by the Japanese. A
representative from Nikon was asked during a recent meeting of
the Semiconductor Equipment Manufacturers Industry (SEMI) in
Hawaii when the latest generat on of photolithography
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equipment would be made available to American firms. The
response from Nikon was "when appropriate". (Robertson, 1990,
p.10) The formation of SEMATECH is an effort to improve the
manufacturing technologies available to American industry
while maintaining the competitive separation of firms needed
by the free market system.
E. INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
"[T]he best way to assure American industry [and the
Department of Defense] of getting the most advanced state-of-
the-art technology is to develop it ourselves." (Robertson,
1990, p.10) The focus of the NACS recommendations are an
effort to improve the competitive position of U.S. firms so
Lily Will be in the pusition to do Just that, contin e
developing state-of-the-art technologies. The NACS position
is surprisingly less protective than would be expected. They
present their recommendations in response to the three areas
described above: market improvements, changes to the business
environment, and emphasis on new technology.
1. The Market
The NACS recommendations focusing on market
improvement revolve around rebuilding the U.S. consumer
electronics industry. If the consumer electronics industry
can be revived, it will improve the customer base available to
the semiconductor industry while slowing the flow of consumer
electronic ownership and manufacturing to eastern pacific
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countries. The specific recommendations include establishing
a consumer electronics capital corporation and enforceing fair
trade practices. Other recommendations aimed at improving the
market situation include establishing standards for electronic
products and accelerating fiber opt c service to the home.
2. The Business Environment
Recommendations voiced to improve the business
environment revolve around improvements in the educational
system, trade law reform, improvements in the protection of
intellectual property, and capital formation incentives.
Recommendations to improve the educational system emphasize
the need to train workers that have technical backgrounds as
well as an increased emphasis on teaching for technical and
engineering degrees at the advanced level. Technical
expertise is stated as being the lifeblood of the industry;
without competent and knowledgeable personnel, the evolution
of new generations of products will be impossible. Trade law
reforms include emphasis on obtaining full access to foreign
markets while continuing anti-dumping regulations and the
protection of intellectual property.
Perhaps the most significant recommendations to
improve the business environment involve incentives for
capital formation. NACS presents numerous suggestions that
would improve the availability of low-cost capital so
desperately needed for this industry to remain competitive.
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Some of these recommendations include: reinstating the
investment tax credit, reducing the capital gains tax, making
the research and development tax credit permanent, and
increasing personal savings incentives. Reducing the federal
deficit is also recommended to slow the flow of foreign
capital into the United States, which in turn fuels the trade
deficit.
3. The Technology
To help increase the technological position of the
semiconductor industry, the NACS recommends increased federal
support of research and development through a variety of
means. This support should continue to be provided through
SEMATECH and centers of academic excellence, as well as
continued funding of research in very high-speed integrated
circuits by DoD and the Department of Energy (DoE). Enhancing
x-ray lithography through support provided from DoE is also
recommended.
F. CONCLUDING VIEW
To sum up the basic views voiced by the NACS and the
semiconductor industry, John Armstrong, vice president for
science and technology at IBM, said that four things can be
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done by industry and government to reverse the trend toward a
declining U.S. semiconductor market share:
" Increase the availability of capital, including a tax cut
for total spending on research and development.
" Extend the 1984 National Cooperative Research Act to
include joint production.
" Support the semiconductor infrastructure through increased
funding of SEMATECH.
" Improve the efforts to produce well-educated workers.
36
III. ECONOMIC THEORY AND VIEWPOINT
Since the importance of the semiconductor market to the
U.S. economy and defense has been established, and the views
and recommendations of industry members have been presented,
it will be useful to examine economic theory and identify the
underlying forces at work in this pattern of trade.
Basic economic theory supports the view that gains can he
made through the conduct of free trade. Two nations can
improve their economic position by producing and trading the
goods at which they are most efficient for those goods which
are relatively more costly for them to produce.
What factors influence this pattern of trade? In
determining the direction of trade flows, relative efficiency
and costs in each country are the critical factors. Vernon
gives us some insight into this situation in his article
"International Investment and International Trade in the
Product Cycle." (Vernon, 1966, p.190) Vernon's model contends
that the location of producers and the mix of inputs are
directly influenced by the product's stage of life. Vernon
divides product life into three different categories: new
product, maturing product, and standardized product.
Vernon's model is based on a few assumptions about
entrepreneurial opportunities and the United States market.
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Entrepreneurial opportunity, and the ability to recognize and
respond to this opportunity, is a direct result of the ease of
communication. The relative ease of communication is a
function of geographical proximity. Vernon (1966, p.192)
emphasizes that "the United States market offers certain
unique kinds of opportunities to those who are in a position
to be aware of them." The United States consumers have an
average income that is higher than other developed countries,
and the labor costs and unrationed capital in the United
States are high as compared to other markets. These factors
influence where an entrepreneur will develop and produce a
product, and in which markets those products will be sold.
A. NEW PRODUCTS
These assumptions lead to the hypothesis that American
producers will be the first to notice and exploit the
opportunity provided by both the relatively high-income and
the natural incentives for labor saving products in the United
States. It also leads to the conclusion that these products
will be produced in the United States. Vernon (1966, p.194)
points out that this assumption is not "self-evident." Least
cost theory asserts that goods are produced where their
production and transportation costs are minimized. However,
Vernon concludes that "...the early producers of a new product
intended for the United States market are attracted to the
United States location by forces which are far stronger than
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relative factor-cost and transport considerations." (Vernon,
1966, p.194) Some of those stronger forces may be related to
the unstandardized nature and design of the developing
product.
As products are developed, they tend to be less
standardized than those in full production. The mix of inputs
and final specifications cover a wide range of possibilities.
This unstandardized design "...carries with it a number of
locational implications." (Vernon, 1966, p.195) Producers
tend to be concerned with the degree of freedom they have to
change their product or its inputs. Demand for the product is
relatively insensitive to price due to the high degree of
product specialization and a monopolistic situation in the
early stages of production. Furthermore, the need for fast
communication between the producers, consumers, and possibly
competitors is relatively high. These implications point to
the conclusion that producers of a new product will want to be
close to the market for which the product is intended.
B. MATURING PRODUCT
As the demand for the product increases, the degree of
standardization in the product increases. Producer-supplier
relationships also increase and become more formal. Prices
and location of inputs become more fixed and predictable, and
competition for production of the product increases as others
enter the market. Factor costs and the efficiency of
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production play a more important role in the continued success
of the product. The need for flexibility in product design
declines while standards of production and economies of scale
become more important considerations.
This changing situation has locational implications. "If
the product has a high income elasticity of demand or if it is
a satisfactory substitute for high-cost labor, the demand in
time will begin to grow rapidly in relatively advanced
countries.... " (Vernon, 1966, p.197) If the demand in these
more advanced countries continues to rise, eventually the
producers will ask themselves if it is worth the risk to
establish production facilities in this foreign country. When
the marginal production costs plus the transportation costs of
products produced in the United States is greater than the
estimated average cost of production in the advanced country,
United States producers will seriously consider investment in
the foreign country. (Vernon, 1966, p.197)
Once production facilities are established in a foreign
country, Vernon notes that a different group of forces are set
in motion. The "...production cost differences between rival
producing areas are usually differences due to scale and
differences due to labor costs." (Vernon, 1966, p.198)
Differences in the international firm's cost of capital
between these alternative locations might also be important,
particularly in areas where labor cost differences are small.
This foreign location also provides an opportunity to service
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third-country markets. And if the factor cost differential
becomes great enough, then "...exports back to the United
States [market] may become a possibility as well." (Vernon,
1966, p.200)
C. STANDARDIZED PRODUCT
As one might expect, in the advanced stage of the
product's production, the factor cost savings in foreign
locations, particularly from labor, provides a competitive
advantage to the firm. An established market and production
process helps reduce the risks associated with overseas
production. As the production process becomes more
standardized, factor costs become increasingly important. The
establishment of production facilities in less-developed
countries then becomes a possibility.
Vernon points out some economic characteristics of
products which may be benefitted by overseas production, at
times where capital cost differences across countries are
negligible.
Their production function is such as to require
significant inputs of labor; otherwise there is no reason
to expect a lower production cost in less-developed
countries. At the same time, they are products with a
high price elasticity of demand for the output of
individual firms; otherwise, there is no strong incentive
to take the risks of pioneering with production in a new
area. In addition, products whose production process did
not rely heavily upon external economies would be more
obvious candidates than those which require a more
elaborate industrial environment. (Vernon, 1966, p.203)
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To summarize Vernon's basic hypothesis, the United States
will export high-income and labor-saving products in the early
stages of production. As the production process matures,
production of these products will migrate overseas, with the
United States eventually importing the goods (Vernon, 1966,
p.201). Assuming these products fit the characteristics
described above, the production facilities could also migrate
to less-developed countries.
Vernon's article also highlights some more subtle
observations of international trade and investment. The
Leontief paradox, the fact that the ratio of capital to labor
in the United States exports was lower than the like ratio of
United States production which had been displaced by
competitive imports, is explained in Vernon's model by the
differences in the product life. In early stages of
production, there is less standardization so the manufacturing
process requires a greater input of skilled labor. As the
manufacturing process matures, the risk of investment in
capital intensive facilities overseas is reduced. "As a
result, the production process relies relatively heavily on
labor inputs at a time when the United States is in an export
position; and the process relies more heavily on capital at a
time when imports become important." (Vernon, 1966, p.202)
Vernon asserts that trade and international investment
will be dependent on the stage of the product life and some
basic economic characteristics, such as the product's price
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elasticity of demand. What other factors might influence
international trade? Hilke and Nelson explored a list of
microeconomic factors that are often linked to the United
States trade deficit. They attempted to isolate important
factors which impact the level of the trade balance through
the use of a complex regression model. Hilke and Nelson also
reviewed some macroeconomic factors that influence trade and
summarized their impact. From their study some interesting
policy conclusions can be drawn.
D. MICROECONOMIC FACTORS
Seven specific microeconomic explanations for the change
in the United States trade position were evaluated by Hilke
and Nelson (Hilke & Nelson, 1988, p.12):
• The High Labor Cost Explanation.
• The Union Work Rules Explanation.
" The Foreign Government Trade Practices Explanation.
" The OPEC Cartel Explanation.
" The Declining R&D Explanation.
" The Inadequate Investment Explanation.
• The Antitrust Explanation.
For each of these explanations, Hilke and Nelson
"...statistically test[ed] for the presence of shifts in the
relationship between U.S. trade patterns and market
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characterist s that are associated with each explanation."
(Hilke & Nel n, 1988, p.5)
1. High Labor Costs
The high labor costs explanation suggests that rapid
increases in United States wage rates during the 1960s and
1970s eroded the manufacturing competitiveness of American
producers. The rate of increase, however, is dramatically
reduced when adjusted for the value of national currencies.
On average, American "... compensation per hour, when adjusted
for the change in output per hour, has been about average for
industrialized countries during the 1975-1983 period." (Hilke
& Nelson, 1988, p.6)
2. Union Work Rules
The union work rules explanation asserts that union
work rules and practices have reduced the productivi-I of the
American worker and hurt the competitiveness of American
firms, thereby encouraging imports. The increase in output
per hour in the U.S. was one of the slowest noted by Hilke and
Nelson. However, this slow in U.S. output per hour can be
attributed to many explanations besides union work practices.
For example, it can be attributed to higher income, providing
firms more incentive to move to service related industries,
and higher use of developing technologies.
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3. Foreign Government Trade Practices
The foreign government trade practices explanation
notes that foreign firms have increasingly received assistance
from their governments to enter specific U.S. markets. The
explanation notes these practices have put American firms at
a disadvantage. Hilke and Nelson point out that while this
targeting does occur, it is not known how effective or
widespread the practice has become, and assistance to domestic
firms from the U.S. government may have offset the effect of
these practices.
4. OPEC Cartel
The OPEC Cartel explanation asserts that U.S.
manufacturers use large amounts of energy relative to foreign
firms. Thus, increases in oil prices, specifically in the
late seventies, hurts U.S. manufacturers more than foreign
manufacturers. However, throughout the 1980s energy prices
were relatively low, without a corresponding reduction in the
trade balance. This effectively negates this argument.
5. Declining R&D
The declining research and development explanation
argues that since R&D expenditures declined throughout the
seventies, the R&D advantage that U.S. firms have enjoyed
since World War II has been eroded. Hilke and Nelson note
that there is some evidence to support this argument. There
was a reduction in U.S. R&D expenditures in relation to GNP in
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the late seventies. At the same time, Germany and Japan
increased their expenditures. However, it is not clear how
this reduction is related to U.S. trade performance. Hilke
and Nelson also note that this "dip" only represents a change
in the increase in knowledge that will be derived from
research, not a change in the stock of cumulative knowledge.
If the decline in R&D is sustained for a long period of time,
the effect might be felt in the balance of trade.
6. Inadequate Investment
The inadequate investment explanation blames U.S. tax
policy for the lower savings rate and poor investment
incentives that exist in the United States. These tax
policies have impacted on the U.S. capital base, making
investment in newer technologies more difficult for American
firms. As Hilke and Nelson point out, only Japan and Canada
have higher rates of capital formation. Even though these
countries have a greater capital formation rate than the
United States, the U.S. still has higher rates than many other
countries. Even though many industrialized countries have
accelerated their capital formation relative to the U.S., our
capital stock is large and it will be some time before the
"gap" narrows.
7. Antitrust
The antitrust explanation asserts that American
antitrust laws impact on U.S. firms' ability to join forces
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and pool resources. While it is true that U.S. antitrust laws
do exist, it is not clear how they might impact international
trade. Hilke and Nelson site empirical evidence that U.S.
firms and plants are larger than their foreign counterparts.
8. Summary of Microeconomic Findings
To summarize the microeconomic findings of Hilke and
Nelson, some evidence is available to support these
explanations but it is far from definitive. The noticeable
change in the U.S. trade position cannot be explained on these
factors alone. But Hilke and Nelson do point out some
macroeconomic factors that have a more substantial impact on
international trade.
E. MACROECONOMIC FACTORS
Two events that have occurred in the late seventies and
early eighties point to strong macroeconomic influences at
work in the balance of trade. The "...increase in U.S.
aggregate demanu relative to foreign aggregate demand and the
increase in U.S. interest rates relative to foreign interest
rates." Both these changes can be caused by the dramatic
increase in the U.S. national debt. (Hilke & Nelson, 1988,
p.1)
The macroeconomic forces at work are summarized by Hilke
and Nelson as follows:
The excess of spending over income provided a powerful
expansionary fiscal policy while higher interest rates had
to be used to attract foreign and domestic investors to
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finance the growth of the debt. A relative increase in
aggregate demand... is expected to lead to a trade
deficit .... A relative increase in U.S. interest rates can
also lead to trade deficits by increasing foreign demand
for U.S. financial assets. The link between financial
flows that respond to interest rate changes and trade
deficits is evident in standard balance of payments
accounting relationships. (Hilke & Nelson, 1988, p.1-2)
Hilke and Nelson conclude that recent budget deficits, not
weakening of industrial characteristics, have lead to the
decline in competitiveness of U.S. firms. Their statistical
evidence does not support the notion that microeconomic forces
have impacted international trade to a large degree. Hilke
and Nelson note that U.S. policy should focus on reducting the
budget deficit rather than focusing on microeconomic factors.
However, they also warn that their analysis is not
"unqualified acceptance" of free trade policies. (Hilke &
Nelson, 1988, p.144)
F. ECONOMIC CONCLUSIONS
Vernon notes that as technologies mature, relative factor
prices become increasingly more important. Hilke and Nelson
point out that macroeconomic policies, especially the growing
budget deficit, have driven up interest rates iii the U.S.,
making capital more expensive. Capital costs, as well as
labor costs, are significant factor costs in Vernon's model,
helping to determine the production location of mature
technologies. The U.S. semiconductor industry has maintained
its comparative advantage in high-technology products like
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microprocessors and specialty chips. The Japanese advantage
is predominately in areas where the technology is relatively
more mature, such as in the production of DRAMs and other
memory devices. This observation is consistent with Vernon's
product life-cycle theory, and the two trade models appear
complimentary.
Trade patterns in semiconductors appear to be responding
to factor price differences, consistent with the historic
pattern, but the budget deficit may also influence the trade
pattern in another way. Increased government spending, and
the increased government borrowing to pay for the deficit,
fuels aggregate demand in the United States. This increased
aggregate demand causez imports in general to rise relative to
exports, helping to support the historical trade pattern
described above. In summary, based on the relative maturity
of the technology involved in the production of DRAMs and
other memories, it is not surprising to see countries that
enjoy lower factor prices producing the majority of those
goods in the global marketplace.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF DOD'S ROLE IN SEMICONDUCTORS
Since the industry's viewpoint and concern has been
established and an economic groundwork has been laid, a closer
analysis of DoD's relationship to the semiconductor industry
is now possible. First, the focus will be on DoD's concern
within the industry, and second, the analysis will focus on
what actions DoD should be pursuing to address those concerns.
A. DOD'S CONCERN IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
As previously discussed, the Department of Defense relies
heavily on semiconductors to improve the capabilities of
today's weapon systems. Approximately two percent of the cost
of the F-4 Phantom aircraft was spent on computers and
software, while the percentage spent on electronics for the
F-15 fighter rose to 25 percent. This reliance on technology
continues to grow. Today, 40 to 50 percent of the cost of the
F-18 is spent on electronic components (U.S. Congress, 1987,
p.28). Despite this growing reliance on technology, DoD
accounts for less than ten percent of semiconductor sales in
the United States and only three percent of the quantity
(Dallmeyer, 1987, p.48). Since DoD's "business" alone cannot
be expected to support the industry, national security
questions arise when the domestic industry appears to be
faltering.
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DoD's concern over its dependence on advanced foreign
technology manifests itself in two fundamental ways. First,
DoD purchases sophisticated electronics from domestic
suppliers and is concerned about maintaining a secure supply.
Second, it relies on the industry to identify and exploit
state-of-the-art technology in designing new weapon systems
(U.S. Congress, 1987, p.29). This concern for a secure supply
and access to advanced technologies leads to a third
consideration, maintaining a strong industry and economy.
1. The Security of Supply
Concerns for a secure supply arise out of a possible
dependence on foreign sources for semiconductors and new
technologies. The extent of DoD's dependence on foreign
sources is difficult to determine, and the exact percentage of
weapons that contain foreign parts is not known (Dallmeyer,
1987, p.49). However, the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Semiconductor Dependency stated that a "...significant
fraction of chips used in the newest systems about to be
deployed are either entirely made, or packaged and tested,
abroad." (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1987, p.2) One of the
more publicized dependencies for semiconductors is on the Far
East, specifically Japan. The task force also noted that
"...acquisition of specific devices or materials from foreign
sources for defense applications is not a critical problem as
long as the U.S. has the knowledge and resources to substitute
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domestic sources in a timely fashion should the supply of
foreign products or technologies be interrupted." (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1987, p.3) Just how should this
domestic source be maintained?
One possible answer to the threat of interrupted
supplies is the stockpiling of foreign made semiconductors
(Dallmeyer, 1987, p.52). The U.S. currently stockpiles many
items for use in an national emergency. The stockpiling of
semiconductors would allow the U.S. to have access to the
semiconductors it needs to continue production of current
weapon systems. However, the stockpiling of semiconductors
raises other questions. For example, what level of supply
should be maintained and how long will the crisis last? Will
advances in technology make stockpiles obsolete before they
can be incorporated in new weapon systems? (Carpenter, 1990,
p.42)
One alternative to stockpiling that is often discussed
revolves around DoD buil& ig its own manufacturing plants to
produce the semiconductors it needs (U.S. Congress, 1987,
p.29). This alternative has some severe shortcomings,
however. It fails to address DoD's reliance on the
semiconductor industry for innovation and advancing
technology. The production solution addresses the supply
problem but also ignores the strong possibility of cost
overruns (Carpenter, 1990, p.49). In short, the establishment
of government owned and run manufacturing facilities is not
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the most efficient solution to maintaining a secure supply of
semiconductors.
Another possible solution to enhance the security of
supply would be to designate domestic "captive" producers,
like IBM, to act as back-up suppliers in a national emergency
or mobilization (Dallmeyer, 1987, p.52). With DoD's
requirements being relatively small, domestic captive
suppliers should be capable of supporting DoD's needs in a
crisis. IBM is considered one of the largest semiconductor
producers in the world, even though all of their production is
designated for its own use. It is reasonable to assume they
can be relied upon to meet any critical shortages, should they
occur.
A final point should be made regarding the security of
supply. The likelihood that foreign suppliers will limit the
quantity or quality of semiconductors to DoD is small. Even
if one country should choose to restrict this supply, it is
certainly unlikely that all foreign producers would do so at
the same time. Foreign producers have a large incentive to
supply the U.S. with semiconductors. For example, Japan has
a constitutional limit on military spending and they rely
heavily on the U.S. for their national defense. It is in
Japan's best interest to supply extremely reliable high-
technology products and ensure a continued U.S. defense
presence in the region (Dallmeyer, 1987, p.55).
53
2. The Ability to Incorporate New Technology
An inherent problem plaguing program managers in DoD
is the incorporation of the most advanced technology in their
weapon systems. Many competing priorities, including time and
money, force a developing system into production. Combine
these difficult decisions with the long lead time of most
weapon systems, and incorporating advanced technology becomes
a non-trivial problem. Even when the most advanced technology
is available to DoD, the technology must be perfected and meet
scheduling "windows" in order to be incorporated in developing
systems (Prabhakar, 1990). To illustrate the point, some of
the most advanced technology has been incorporated into the B-
2 Stealth bomber; however, the grand central station of its
interlinked computer system is a black box based on a 16-bit
microprocessor. By today's standards, the 16-bit
microprocessor is already considered obsolete, except for
performing all but the most routine tasks (Grier, 1989, p.36).
This concern is a very real one and demands a great
deal of consideration. For DoD to continue producing the most
advanced weapons in the world, it must have access to state-
of-the-art technologies. When discussing the national
security issue and technology, defining defense technology
base becomes important. It can be described as "... the
combination of people, institutions, information, and skills
that provide the technology used to develop and manufacture
weapons and other defense systems." (Moore, 1989, p.24)
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Creativity and innovation have been the strong points of
American industry for years, and these competitive skills have
given DoD access to the best technologies in the past.
However, a decline in the manufacturing expertise of American
semiconductor producers raises the concern of continued access
to advanced technologies in the future. Efforts have been
focused on defense design expertise vice production and
manufacturing technologies. This is the central concern of
the semiconductor industry today. Industry feels that
"although American basic research technology is virulent,
manufacturing expertise continues to be the Achilles heal of
the commercial and defense semiconductor technology base."
(Moore, 1989, p.29)
While maintaining a strong manufacturing base is
important, American semiconductor producers should rely on
leveraging their strong points. The U.S. currently leads the
world in highly creative technologies such as software
engineering, applications technologies, and computer
architectures (CSPP, 1990, p.25). DoD's efforts should be
focused on maintaining and exploiting these traditional
strong-points of the American industry. What is important is
access to the technical knowledge necessary to produce state-
of-the-art semiconductors. However, it is not important to
restore American leadership in manufacturing the more mature
technologies of DRAM production. This is a subtle but
substantial difference.
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Access to critical production technologies is
important. However, the processes used to produce advanced
chips is changing, and the technologies currently used in
semiconductor manufacturing may not be appropriate for the
chips introduced in the later 1990s (U.S. Congress, 1990,
p.69). For example, optical lithography will be replaced by
X-ray lithography and other technologies as resolutions
continue to move into the sub-micron level. American research
and development in process technology for advanced products is
important to DoD's needs. This technological base can no
longer be taken for granted. DoD's support for projects like
SEMATECH, a manufacturing process research consortium for
advanced memory chips, attempts to address those concerns.
Concern ovcr losing the technology base also leads to a more
fundamental consideration, maintaining a strong industry and
economy.
3. A Strong Industry and Economy
A strong economy is central to the national defense of
the United States, and a strong semiconductor industry could
be considered central to the technological superiority of
American forces. However, careful considerations should be
made when evaluating what support DoD should provide the
industry in the name of national security.
American semiconductor strength should be focused on
the production of emerging technologies. Concentrating on
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products which are in the early stages of their product life
is important. Industry's concerns in this area are not
totally unfounded. Japan and other semiconductor producers
have a growing lead in the production of advanced memories.
Large amounts of capital are being invested as Japanese firms
strive to be first in the production of 64-megabit chips
(Sanger, 1990, p.cl). Some of this production technology
provides the ability to produce other advanced circuits, but
not all. Production of simpler memory circuits at high
volumes does not directly translate into the ability to
produce advanced specialty chips at low volume, and the
majority of the chips used by DoD are of this latter category.
As already noted, American strength lies in innovation
and creative enterprises. It lags other countries in capital
intensive technologies, such as large scale fabrication and
manufacturing (CSPP, 1990, p.25). When considering the
macroeconomic forces at work in our system of free trade, this
situation should not be a surprise. The American
semiconductor industry leads the world in most areas except in
the production of the more mature technologies like memories.
The value of this technology has already been established.
However, DoD's focus should not be to help restore the
American industry to its previous position of economic
superiority in all areas of semiconductor manufacturing. The
focus of DoD efforts should be on enhancing the areas in which
the industry strength lies.
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The discussion of maintaining a virile semiconductor
industry with a focus on its strengths in innovation and
engineering leads to the question of what role should DoD play
to accomplish these objectives.
B. DOD'S ROLE IN THE INDUSTRY
First, history shows that protectionism is not the answer.
Trade sanctions against foreign low-tech competition will not
help domestic producers become more efficient. The higher
DRAM prices that resulted after the trade sanctions of the
late 1980s only had the effect of hurting U.S. electronics
producers who were forced to purchase the more expensive
chips. (The Economist, 1989, p.76)
A focus on high technology innovation should be the thrust
of DoD and government policies. Maintaining the most advanced
process technologies should be emphasized while creating an
environment which supports the conduct of a strong, innovative
industry. Three key success factors are critical to the
competitiveness of U.S. firms in the computer industry: the
business environment; the research, development and
manufacturing relationship; and the people and culture of U.S.
firms (CSPP, 1990, p.25).
1. Business Environment
Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of recommendations
put forward by the NACS, and summarized earlier in the second
chapter, fit nicely into the economic trade theory presented
58
in the fourth chapter. An increase in factor costs in the
U.S. has accelerated the movement of relatively more mature
production technologies to areas with lower factor costs. It
should be noted that Japanese producers are open to this
economic pressure as well. As wages and interest rates rise
in Japan, they will come under increasingly greater pressure
from other manufacturing areas. Some of this competition can
already be seen in the rise of the Asian/Pacific producers of
semiconductors (excluding Japan). Improving the business
environment in the U.S. entails actions that will help reduce
the factor costs of domestic manufacturers.
The most substantial improvement in the business
environment can be achieved by a reduction in interest rates
and a corresponding reduction in the cost of available
capital. The cost of capital can be reduced in a number of
ways; the most effective would be a reduction in the size of
the federal deficit. Increasing incentives for savings and
possible changes in the tax system would also help to increase
the amount of affordable capital available for investment in
capital intensive industries.
Reduction of interest rates is not the only action
that may improve the competitiveness of domestic producers.
Continued pursuit of intellectual property protection, fair
and open competition in foreign markets, and changes in
domestic anti-trust legislation all play a part in the health
of the U.S. semiconductor industry. Changes in anti-trust
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legislation may help to stimulate greater research cooperation
among firms and encourage more vertical integration in areas
where industry finds that these changes are appropriate. It
has been assumed that large American "captive" producers do
not sell their semiconductors on the open market for fear of
unfair competition and discrimination charges. The large
Japanese semiconductor producers do not come under the same
close scrutiny.
It must be emphasized that improvements in the
business environment will not occur until the macroeconomic
elements are improved. Hilke and Nelson warn that other
practices are relatively less effective in changing the
pattern of trade than a focus on macroeconomic influences. A
reduction in interest rates and a favorable change in the
pattern of trade are not possible until there is a substantial
reduction in the federal budget deficit.
2. R&D and Manufacturing
The key success factor regarding research and
development (R&D) and manufacturing involves the level of
spending in applied R&D, basic R&D, and manufacturing R&D.
Historically, American firms have focused on applied R&D while
basic R&D was performed at universities. Manufacturing R&D
has had relatively little focus in the American semiconductor
induztry. This historical separation of R&D is not
appropriate in semiconductor production. As already noted,
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the ability to produce memories at a sub-micron level is
critical in testing the validity of the manufacturing process.
It assures that the process is sound and permits the
production of more complex chips, such as microprocessors.
A major action to improve the linkages between
research and manufacturing is DoD's support of SEMATECH. The
formation of SEMATECH required a change in anti-trust
legislation and an increased commitment in cooperation among
member firms. Their performance will determine if other
manufacturing related research consortiums are attempted in
the future.
Unfortunately, the level and risk of additional
dollars for research and development hinge around the
prevailing cost of capital. Just as the federal budget
deficit influences the pattern of trade, the deficit
influences the availability and cost of capital. "Problems in
obtaining R&D funding at reasonable rates will never be solved.
until the...federal deficit is reduced substantially."
(Dallmeyer, 1987, p.55)
3. People and Culture
The key success factor regarding people and culture is
most often manifested in recommendations to improve the
educational system in the United States. A stronger emphasis
on more technical education is needed as more highly trained
and knowledgeable workers are required in "high-tech" firms.
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While an improvement in the educational system will be
of benefit to all, a change in the focus and thrust of the
organization may be just as important to their
competitiveness. American companies have been accused of
having a short term perspective with an eye on the quarterly
financial statements. This focus may have limited their
success in capital intensive areas that require longer term
investments.
The explanation for American firms' shorter term
financial focus is in part the increased risk of capital
investments caused by higher interest rates. One can suppose
that as short term financial success becomes increasingly more
important to the corporation, managers with financial
backgrounds will tend to rise more quickly in the
organization. The firm, therefore, will focus more on
financial performance than on longer term manufacturing
capability. The greater risk of capital investments will
correspondingly lead to decreased investments in research and
development. Over time, the competitive advantage the firm
may have enjoyed will ne eroded. Once again, the effects of
the federal budget deficit can be seen.
Other organizational factors that affect the
performance of the firm may result from this shorter term
perspective.
The problem in many Western companies is not that their
senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan
nor that the Japanese companies possess greater technical
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capabilities. Instead, it is their adherence to a concept
of the corporation that unnecessarily limits the ability
of individual businesses to fully exploit the deep
reservoir of technological capability that many
American...companies possess. (Prahalad & Hamal, 1990,
p.82)
The failure to exploit this technological capability is the
result of failing to identify with the "core competencies"
within the organization. Core compeLencies can be defined as
the "...collective learning in the organization, especially
how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate
multiple streams of technologies." (Prahalad & Hamal, 1990,
p.82) In simpler terms, core competencies are the
technologies that are at the "core" of your organization.
Historically, American firms have excelled in
developing and introducing advanced technologies. This can be
viewed as one of their core competencies. American firms may
have lost the focus and guidance of these core competencies.
A renewed emphasis on ingenuity and innovation in the
semiconductor industry may go a long way in improving
competitive performance.
A focus on core competency has many benefits. It
helps direct the actions of members of the firm in the same
direction. When a firm focuses on its strong points, they are
in a position to take advantage of progressing technologies in
new and different markets. For example, "Canon's core
competencies in optics, imaging, and microprocessor controls
have enabled it to enter...markets as seemingly diverse as
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copiers, laser printers, cameras, and image scanners."
(Prahalad & Hamal, 1990, p.83) American semiconductor firms'
abandonment of the DRAM marketplace, particularly higher
capacity DRAMs that are currently in the introduction phase
(recall Figure 1.3), may be considered as an abandonment of
one of the core competencies of the semiconductor industry.
Once lost, the technology and expertise is difficult to
recapture.
Another result of focusing on core competencies is a
tendency toward vertical integration. In areas that a firm
considers critical, vertical integration is a logical action
for protection of those technologies. Prahalad and Hamal
emphasize that cultivating core competencies does not mean
outspending competitors in research and development or
restructuring to become more vertically integrated. However,
firms that focus on these critical technologies tend to do
just that.
DoD cannot be expected to influence the internal
operations of individual firms; however, government policies
which reduce the federal budget deficit and help create an
environment which is conducive to innovation and technological
advance will go a long way toward ensuring that national
security objectives are met within the semiconductor industry.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
A. CONCLUSIONS
The health of the semiconductor industry is indeed vital
to DoD's ability to incorporate advancing technology into
developing weapon systems. However, recent changes in the
structure and size of the industry do not necessarily
constitute a threat to our national security. Most of the
changes that occurred during the 1980s could have been
predicted considering the changes in factor prices and the
relative maturity of the technologies involved.
The rapid loss in market share that American producers
experienced over the past decade is due primarily to the
abandonment of the DRAM marketplace. Most American firms were
not able to withstand the tremendous drop in memory prices
that occurred in the mid 1980s. Japanese producers also lost
billions, but were in a financial condition to ride out the
downturn. The answer to American semiconductor producers'
concerns is not to protect the domestic market until they can
produce memories more efficiently. Some evidence already
exists that hostilities in the memory market have shifted
foreign semiconductor producers' focus to the valuable market
for microprocessors. The answer to American producers'
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concern is a focus on what has historically made them strong:
innovation in a free and open marketplace.
The critical elements in the national security question
are insuring the security of supply and maintaining DoD's
access to advancing technologies. The possibility that
semiconductors will be withheld from DoD by foreign suppliers
seems unlikely. Even if this unlikely event should occur, it
seems reasonable to assume that domestic "captive" producers
could meet DoD's needs in an emergency. Foreign producers are
more likely to withhold manufacturing technologies from their
American counterparts until they achieve a competitive
advantage in the process. A more critical concern is
maintaining DoD's access to emerging technologies, since it
relies on American industry for expertise in identifying and
exploiting them in developing weapon systems.
American semiconductor manufacturers should focus on their
ability to create new and advancing technologies without
reaffirming themselves as leaders in the DRAM marketplace.
However, access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing
technologies is critical in keeping the U.S. manufacturers
strong in the production of advanced microprocessors and other
lower volume chips. A reduction in the cost of capital is
important in order to maintain the level of research and
development required to compete in process technologies.
DoD's and government's efforts should be addressed to
lowering the federal budget deficit and encouraging more
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cooperation among firms. Improvements in anti-trust
legislation, along with tax incentives to increase investment
and savings, can help stimulate a more competitive business
environment, not only for semiconductor firms, but for all
related industries as well. An environment must be created
that allows domestic firms the flexibility to take a longer
term focus on capital budgeting decisions. Again, the
positive externalities of a reduction in the federal deficit
is the single most important action the U.S. government can
take to improve the competitiveness of domestic manufacturers.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Due to the limited scope of this thesis, many areas are
available for further study. The following list is by no
means a complete list of related subject areas, but it should
provide some ideas for continued research.
" To what extent is DoD truly reliant on the foreign
production and manufacture of semiconductors?
" What U.S. weapon systems are dependent on foreign chips?
What possible actions could be taken to safeguard their
readiness?
" How effective has SEMATECH been in accomplishing its
objectives? Has it been effective in transferring
developed technologies to member firms? Have any of its
manufacturing technologies been applied to developing
weapon systems within DoD?
• What is the relationship between SEMATECH's smaller firms
and its larger members?
0 Will lower interest rates and the corresponding lower cost
of capital be enough to increase the level of investment
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in research and development within the semiconductor
industry? Are other factor prices influencing the balance
of trade?
* How important is the DRAM industry to the long term
competitiveness of American semiconductor producers? Is
the DRAM market out of the reach of domestic producers?
Will a reduction in the cost of capital improve the
industry's opportunities to reenter the DRAM marketplace?
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